Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2000

Greg F. Knight, Steve Hall, Roy Neizer, and Brock
Hudson v. Salt Lake County : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Brian M. Barnard, James L. Harris, Jr.; Utah Legal Clinic; Attorneys for Appellants.
David Yocom; Salt Lake County District Attorney; John Soltis, Valerie Wilde; Deputy District
Attorneys; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Knight v. Salt Lake County, No. 20000864 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2931

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL,
ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON,
personally and on behalf of a
class of persons similarly
situated,

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANTS
Case No.

20000864-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
Priority number 15,
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
governmental entity,
Defendant/Appellee.

AN APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, Hon. David Young, Judge Presiding
(Trial Court Case No. 97-090-7950 CV)

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JAMES L. HARRIS, JR. USB # 8204
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531
DAVID YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney
JOHN SOLTIS & VALERIE WILDE
Deputy District Attorneys
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
2001 South State Street, South Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-2607
UWi Court of Appeals

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

JUN 0 ? 2001
CiBik of the Court

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL,
ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON,
personally and on behalf of a
class of persons similarly
:
situated,

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANTS
Case No.

20000864-CA

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
Priority number 15.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
governmental entity,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

:

AN APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, Hon. David Young, Judge Presiding
(Trial Court Case No. 97-090-7950 CV)

BRIAN M. BARNARD
USB # 0215
JAMES L. HARRIS, JR. USB # 8204
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
214 East Fifth South Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
Telephone: (801) 328-9531
DAVID YOCOM
Salt Lake County District Attorney
JOHN SOLTIS & VALERIE WILDE
Deputy District Attorneys
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
2001 South State Street, South Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190
Telephone: (801) 468-2607
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

1

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS REPLY

1

REPLY ARGUMENT

3

I.

PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS' WAGE CLAIM IS A CONTRACTUAL
CLAIM
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

II.

3

PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS DO NOT ASSERT THAT COUNTY
POLICIES FORM A CONTRACT

3

THERE ARE NO PUBLIC POLICY CONCERNS
IN THE INSTANT CASE

3

UTAH LAW HOLDS THAT CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS CO-EXIST
WITH STATUTORY RIGHTS

4

PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS HAVE WRITTEN EMPLOYMENT
CONTRACTS

6

PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS' WRITTEN CONTRACTS COMPLY
WITH COUNTY ORDINANCES

8

OTHER JURISDICTIONS DISTINGUISHED

9

THERE ARE NO STATUTES, POLICIES AND/OR PROCEDURES TO
JUSTIFY NON-COMPENSATION OF TIME WORKED
11

III. PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS' WAGE CLAIM IS WITHIN THE
APPROPRIATE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

13

CONCLUSION

14

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

15

APPENDIX/ATTACHMENTS

17

Attachment "A":

Horn v. Ut. Dept. of Pub. Safety,
962 P.2d 95 (Ut. App. 1998)
iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Chotkowski v. State of Connecticut, 240 Conn. 246,
690 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1997)

9

Horn v. Ut. Dept. of Pub. Safety,
962 P.2d 95 (Ut. App. 1998)

4, 5, 6

National R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe
Railway Co. , 470 U.S. 451 (1985)
9, 10
Thurston v. Box Elder County,
835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992)

4

Thurston v. Box Elder County,
892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995)

4

Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663 (Utah 1985)

8

Weese v. Davis County Comm'n, 834 P.2d 1 (Utah 1992)

...

4, 5

Utah Statutes and Constitutional Provisions
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23 (2) (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended)

13
....

Utah Constitution, Article XIV, § 3

13, 14
5

Ordinances, Policies & Procedures
Salt Lake County Ordinance, § 2.04.100

5, 8

Salt Lake County Personnel Policy & Procedure,
Overtime & Compensatory Time, # 5105 (2.8)
Sheriff's Office Policy and Procedure, § 2-5-03.02

12
. . .

11, 12

Miscellaneous Authority
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990)

iv

8

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

GREG F. KNIGHT, STEVE HALL,
ROY NEIZER and BROCK HUDSON,
:
personally and on behalf of a
class of persons similarly
:
situated,

REPLY BRIEF
OF APPELLANTS

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
:

Case No. 20000864-CA

vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a
governmental entity,

:

Defendant/Appellee.

:

AN APPEAL FROM SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED BY THE THIRD
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH,
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, Hon. David Young, Judge Presiding
(Trial Court Case No. 97-090-7950 CV)

Plaintiffs/Appellants

(hereinafter "Plaint if f-Of f icers,/)

submit the following reply brief in further support of their
appeal from the judgment below:
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The County's gratuitous recitation of its Issues Presented
for Review in this appeal is not helpful.
not filed an appeal.

Salt Lake County has

Plaintiff-Officers' opening brief sets

forth the issues presented for review and now before this Court.

STATEMENT OF PACT REPLY1
The County states that it adopted policies regarding pay
practices.

Brief of Appellee Salt Lake County (hereinafter

"County Appellee Brief"), 7.

None of those policies control or

relate to the issue at hand.

No policy forces Plaintiff-Officers

to work without pay.

Neither the Sheriff's Office Policy and

Procedures nor the Salt Lake Personnel Policies direct that the
Plaintiff-Officers should not be paid for briefings.
Rather, the decision not to pay for the briefings was an
erroneous interpretation by the jail commanders.
Biesele, 11/21/1996, f 12 (R. 730).

Aff. of

Plaintiff-Officers were

ordered by supervisors not to record the briefing time on their
time cards.

Interr. Answers Hudson, 8-9, f 11 (R. 688-689); 2nd

Depo. of Cunningham, 18:14 to 19:6 (R. 723).

Those Plaintiff-

Officers who did record the briefing time on their time cards
were ordered by their supervisors to remove that time from the
time cards.2

Interr. Answers Hudson, 8-9, 1 11 (R. 688-689); 2nd

Depo. of Cunningham, 19:17 to 20:23 (R. 723).

1

Many of the County's "facts" are in reality argument.
Accordingly, much of Plaintiff-Officers' reply to these "facts"
is contained within the Argument section herein.
2

When the County became aware of that erroneous interpretation and the non-payment, the County partially corrected the
error and paid most jail staff and plaintiff class members for
the briefing time worked retroactively to February 1, 1994.
County Appellee Brief, at 9; see also Appendix E to the County's
Brief, No. 1 page 4.
2

REPLY ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS' WAGE CLAIM IS A CONTRACTUAL CLAIM.
A.

Plaintiff-Officers Do Not Assert That County Policies
Form A Contract.

The County mis-states Plaintiff-Officers' position herein.
County Appellee Brief, 10.

Plaintiff-Officers do not assert that

county policies form a contract.

Rather, Plaintiff-Officers have

written contracts which modify merit status and county policies.
In particular, Plaintiff-Officers have written contracts which
set forth that each would work for Salt Lake County and the
County would pay for their services.

These documents set forth

the nature of the employment, starting date of employment, rate
of pay, job code and other information establishing the nature of
employment.3
B.

There Are No Public Policy Concerns In The Instant
Case.

The County relies upon public policy concerns regarding the
terms of civil service employment; the County states, generally,
that "[i]t is well settled that the terms and conditions of
public service in office or employment rest in legislative policy
rather than contractual obligations, and hence may be changed."
3

The County insists that the Plaintiff-Officers'
"employment rights are strictly a creation of statute and County
policy.'' County Appellee Brief, 13. However, there are specific
terms of the employment agreements that are found neither in
statute nor policy. These terms are set forth only in the
Plaintiff-Officers' employment contract.
3

County Appellee Brief, 11 (citing Horn v. Utah Department of
Public Safety, 962 P.2d 95, 101 (Ut. App. 1998) (a copy of which
is attached hereto as Attachment "A")).

However, the facts

herein do not implicate a change in the terms of employment.
Plaintiff-Officers have at no time requested a change in the
terms of employment.

Nor has the County sought a change.

Rather, Plaintiff-Officers seek to enforce terms that have
remained constant:

compensation for service rendered.

That

public policy rationale is irrelevant in the instant case.
C.

Utah Law Holds that Contractual Rights Co-Exist With
Statutory Rights.

The County asserts that courts have "struggled" to apply
contract commitments to civil servants.
incorrect.

This statement is

Rather, the courts have categorized different rights

and applied different analysis depending on the right being
enforced.

For example, Plaintiff-Officers are subject to

statutory limitations when the county cannot (or does not) fund
merit pay increases for a particular year.
Comm'n, 834 P.2d 3 (Utah 1992).

Weese v. Davis County

Plaintiff-Officers are subject

to statutory limitations should the county re-evaluate a
particular job or perform a county-wide reassessment of all jobs.
See Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P.2d 165 (Utah 1992); and,
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 1995).
ination of government employment is subject to statutory
regulation, and administrative procedure.
4

Horn.

County

Term-

commissions cannot enter into contracts guaranteeing future wage
increases for employees.

Weese; Utah Const, art. XIV, § 3.

A

county cannot enter into a contract guaranteeing future or
continued employment.

Utah Const, art. XIV, § 3.

entered with Salt Lake County must be in writing.
County Ordinance § 2.04.100.

Every contract
Salt Lake

Finally, any contract entered

beyond the authority granted to a County is null and void.
Weese.
The foregoing cases, however, have never held that county
employees do not have contractual employment or contractual
employment rights.4

These cases acknowledge that counties can

contract with employees.

The court must look to the right that

is being enforced to see whether a statutory or contractual
analysis applies.

Plaintiff-Officers' wage claim is a

contractual claim and subject to a contractual analysis.
As noted, Horn held that as to certain aspects of government
employment (i.e., termination of employment), there are statutes,
rules and regulations that govern.
are easily distinguishable.

The facts of the instant case

There are no statutes, policies, or

4

Indeed, the County explicitly acknowledges Utah cases
which hold that contractual rights co-exist with statutory
rights. See County Appellee Brief, 12 n.5 ("public employees
have a contractual right to accrued benefits''; "personnel policy
manuals or other agreements between state agencies and their
employees can create contractual rights in addition to public
employees' underlying statutory rights"). The general statement
that the County keeps repeating ("Jailers are statutory
employees.") is not accurate nor helpful.
5

administrative rules applicable to the situation at bar.
Although administrative rules and a procedure were available for
the appellant in Horn to challenged his termination, there are no
similar applicable administrative rules or procedures for the
jailers to force the county to pay for time worked (and for which
the jail commanders erroneously declined to pay).

Therefore, the

analysis in Horn is of limited use herein.
D.

Plaintiff-Officers Have Written Employment Contracts.

The County contends that the documents Plaintiff-Officers
introduced to show a written contract are documents which
evidence their statutory merit employment status.
Appellee Brief, 14.

County

Such an argument assumes that the two

categories of rights (contractual and statutory) are mutually
exclusive.

There are not.

They coexist concurrently.

The

statutory and contractual rights of state or county employees are
concomitant.
The County asserts that Plaintiff-Officers ''failed to meet
their burden of establishing a written contract 'adding to' or
'altering' their statutory employment relationship with the
County."
case).

County Appellee Brief at 18 (a reference to the Horn
The County asserts that the Plaintiff-Officers "were

unable to produce signed written employment agreements evidencing
an intent to create employment by contract and the court
correctly found that the employment documents did not alter or

6

add to the terms and conditions of their statutory public
employment."

County Appellee Brief, 15.

These statements are inaccurate.

Plaintiff-Officers

produced documents to establish written contracts whereby each
would work for Salt Lake County and the County would pay for
their services.

Those documents include Letter from Sheriff N.D.

"Pete" Hayward to Brock E. Hudson of January 11, 1990 (R. 130),
Letter from Sheriff Aaron D. Kennard to Roy David Neizer of June
1, 1991 (R. 131), Notice of Personnel Action (R. 132 & 133), Salt
Lake County Deputy Sheriff's Merit Service Commission Policies
and Procedures (R. 134-140 (policy related to payment of wages)),
and, written agreements to follow such rules (R. 141).

These

various documents combined constitute an employment contract
based upon written instruments.

These documents set forth the

nature of the employment, starting date of employment, rate of
pay, job code and other information establishing the nature of
employment.

Absent these written documents, the terms and

conditions of Plaintiff-Officers' employment are not determined.5
The County asserts that Plaintiff-Officers have presented no
"integrated writing which establishes a contract . . . ."
Appellee Brief, 9.

County

An "integrated writing" is defined as "The

writing or writings adopted by the parties to an agreement as the

5

For example, Plaintiff-Officers' individual hourly rates
and job levels are set not by statute, but rather by these
"integrated" written agreements between employee and employer.
7

final and complete expression of the agreement."
Dictionary 809 (6th ed. 1990).

Black's Law

Utah law describes an "integrated

writing" as follows:
where the parties reduce an agreement to a writing
which in view of its completeness and specificity
reasonably appears to be a complete agreement, it is
taken to be an integrated agreement unless it is
established by other evidence that the writing did not
constitute a final expression.
Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663, 665 (Utah 1985) (quoting
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 209(3)

(1981)).

Herein, each Plaintiff-Officer has written documents
establishing a contract whereby each would work for Salt Lake
County and the County would pay for their services.
documents are identified above.

Those

Those various documents combined

constitute an employment contract based upon written instruments.
Those documents are the "integrated instruments" which form the
contract governing Plaintiff-Officers' compensation and
employment.
E.

Plaintiff-Officers' Written Contracts Comply With
County Ordinances.

Salt Lake County Ordinance § 2.04.100 declares that all
county contracts must be in writing.

Nevertheless, the County

claims that this ordinance does not apply herein.6

The County

asserts that the ordinance "is part of larger procurement
process."

6

County Appellee Brief, 15.

A review of the ordinance,

The County cites no authority to support this claim.
8

its context and location within the county code reveals no such
larger process.

Even if that were true, such a "larger process"

does not preclude application to employment contracts.

Nothing

in that ordinance indicates that it does not apply to employment.
Indeed, every Plaintiff-Officer has a written employment contract
signed by all three county commissioners, giving strong
indication that the ordinance does apply to the situation herein.
F.

Other Jurisdictions Distinguished.

Finally, the County cites, without adequate analysis, two
(2) cases from other jurisdictions to support its contention that
all public employees are statutory employees:

Chotkowski v.

State of Connecticut, 240 Conn. 246, 690 A.2d 368 (Conn. 1997),
and National R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe
Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451 (1985).

These two (2) cases are

inapposite to the case at bar.
Chotkowski involved a state employee who claimed "the state
of Connecticut improperly reduced his salary while he was
employed at the state Veteren's Hospital . . . ."
370.

690 A.2d at

In Connecticut, "state employees serve by appointment, and

^their entitlement to pay and other benefits must be determined
by reference to the statutes and regulations governing
[compensation], rather than to ordinary contract principles.'"
Id. at 380 (bracket in original - citations omitted).

In the

case at bar, there are no statutes, policies, procedures, etc.,

9

that determine Plaintiff-Officers' compensation.

The deter-

mination of Plaintiff-Officers' compensation is found in the
contractual documents noted above.

Furthermore, no overt action

by the County forces Plaintiff-Officers to work uncompensated
(unlike the explicit determination to reclassify and reduce
salary in Chotkowki).

The rules, policies and procedures of the

County mandate that Plaintiff-Officers be paid for time worked.
National R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchinson, Topeka & Sante Fe
Railway Co., 470 U.S. 451 (1985), was an attempt by several
railroads to determine that the Rail Passenger Service Act of
1970 constituted a contract and/or created contractual
obligations with the United States.

The Supreme Court ultimately

determined that the Act did not create a binding obligation.
Herein, Plaintiff-Officers do not argue that a certain
legislative act or ordinance of Salt Lake County constitutes a
contract.

Rather, Plaintiff-Officers assert that they have

contractual rights concomitant with their statutory rights.

The

terms and conditions of Plaintiff-Officers' compensation are set
forth largely in the contractual documents noted above, not by
any legislative or regulatory action.
Therefore, this Court should determine Plaintiff-Officers'
wage claim is based upon the written contracts of the parties,
and that the lower court erred in ruling that appellants were not
contractual employees.

10

II.

THERE ARE NO STATUTES, POLICIES AND/OR PROCEDURES TO JUSTIFY
NON-COMPENSATION OF TIME WORKED.
The County states that neither the statute nor the policies

mandated by statute create written employment with public
employees.

County Appellee Brief, 16.

While this is a true

statement, it ignores the fact that Plaintiff-Officers have
concomitant contractual rights.

Furthermore, it ignores the fact

that the County's policies and procedures mandate payment for
time worked.
The County asserts that County rules required PlaintiffOfficers to record their time worked in 15 minutes increments.
County Appellee Brief, 17.

Such a policy does not mean that the

county could require employees to work fourteen (14) minutes
extra every day without pay.

There is no policy that requires

Plaintiff-Officers to work uncompensated for any amount of time.
The County's repeated citation to a rule about "overtime"
(County Appellee Brief, 17-19) is not helpful.

Sheriff's Office

Policy and Procedure ("SOPP") 2-5-03.02(6), Appendix B to County
Appellee Brief.

The time at issue, the briefing time, is

referred to in the rules as "excess time."

SOPP 2-5-03.02(6).

Plaintiff-Officers receive their normal hourly rate for "excess
time", as opposed to a premium rate (1H normal hourly rate) for
"overtime".

SOPP 2-5-03.02(6).

That the County treated "overtime" of less than 15 minutes
as de minimis

and not compensable (County Appellee Brief, 19),
11

does not alter the fact that plaintiff/jailers were required to
work ten (10) minutes of "excess time" on a daily basis for which
they should have been compensated under the county's own rules.7
SOPP 2-5-03.02(6); see also Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff's
Merit Service Commission ("DSMSC") Policy and Procedure # 5105,
Attachment "E", Plaintiff-Officers' Opening Brief (R. 134-140).
Salt Lake County asserts that "Since County policy required
time to be recorded in 15 minute increments there are no time
records to determine if and when employees reported to briefing
session."

County Appellee Brief, 5.

Plaintiff-Officers were

required to be at work ten minutes early before each and every
shift.

No further records are necessary other than the

employment records of each class member.
The County was able to calculate and pay the briefing time
retroactively for two (2) years as per the Villalobos action.
County Appellee Brief, 19.

Using the same methods and comparable

records, the County knows what extra time Plaintiff-Officers
worked for which they should be paid.

In addition, the payments

made in the Villalobos case are an admission by the County of its
non-payment for work actually performed by those PlaintiffOfficers .

7

The County admits that it should have paid PlaintiffOfficers for the briefing time. The County states, "After the
Villalobos lawsuit was filed, the County realized that briefing
sessions should be compensable . . . ." County Appellee Brief,
19.
12

Finally, the County ignores the fact that plaintiff/jailers
were told not to record or submit briefing time on their time
sheets.

Plaintiff-Officers Brief of Appellant, 11 1 19.

The

County is not being entirely forthright by stating that
Plaintiff-Officers have been paid "for all hours recorded"
(County Appellee Brief, 19), when the County knows that the
Plaintiff-Officers were instructed not to record the briefing
time that is the subject matter of this lawsuit.

III. PLAINTIFF-OFFICERS' WAGE CLAIM IS WITHIN THE APPROPRIATE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
The County claims Plaintiff-Officers are attempting to
extend the FLSA statute of limitations to establish a six (6)
year statute of limits.

County Appellee Brief, 19.

accurate; Plaintiff-Officers make no such claim.

That is not

Rather,

Plaintiff-Officers directly assert a six (6) year statute of
limits because their claims herein are based upon written
employment contracts.

Ut. Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1953 as

amended).
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended) applies to
"a liability created by the statutes of this state."

No statute

of this state creates the liability of Salt Lake County to pay
wages to the Plaintiff-Officers.

The liability or obligation of

the County to pay wages is based upon the written employment
contracts between the County and the Plaintiff-Officers.
13

Therefore, the lower court's invocation of Utah Code Ann. §
78-12-26 (4) (1953 as amended) is not supported by any case law
or authority.

CONCLUSION
The County's repeated general claim "the terms and
conditions of public service in office or employment rest in
legislative policy rather than contractual obligations" (County
Appellee Brief, 20) is much too broad and is thus not supported
by the case law within or without Utah.

This Court should

determine that the documents presented by Plaintiff-Officers
establish written employment contracts; that Plaintiff-Officers
were employees of Salt Lake County based upon written employment
contracts thereby subjecting their wage claims to a six-year
statute of limitations; and re^mand the case below for an
accounting of wages owed to named plaintiffs and plaintiff class,

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 8th day of JUNE 2001.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS

&J~

by

I

BRIAN M. BARNARD
JAMES L. HARRIS, Jr,
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Salt Lake County District Attorney
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Deputy District Attorneys
Attorneys for Appellee, Salt Lake County
2001 South State Street, South Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
84190
on the 8th day of JUNE, 2001, postage prepaid in the United
States Postal Service.
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
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by:
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JAMES L. HARRIS,

I
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APPENDIX/ATTACHMENTS
Attachment "A":

Horn v. Ut. Dept. of Pub. Safety,
962 P.2d 95 (Ut. App. 1998).

17

Michael W. HOM, Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY, a governmental agency; Cherie Ertel; Douglas Bodrero; A. Roland
Squire; Arthur Hudachko; Bart Blackstock; and John Does I through X, Defendants and Appellees.
No. 970592-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
July 16, 1998.
Former employee of Department of
Public Safety brought action against Depart402(25). Under the plain language of the definitions contained in the Act. V-l is a responsible party if it is the owner of a UST facility or
has experienced releases. Although V-l may
not be the only responsible party, it is liable for
the abatement if it is at least a responsible party
under the Act Cf. DEQ v. Wind River Petroleum. 881 P.2d 369, 873 (Utah 1994) (holding
Utah Hazardous Substances Mitigation Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 19-6-301 to -325 (1991 and
Supp.1993), imposes strict liability on owner or
operator of facility as responsible party).

%

Utah
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ment and individuals, alleging breach of employment contract and disability discrimination. The District Court, Henriod, J., granted
defendants' summary judgment motion, and
former employee appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: (1) former employee failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, and thus, Court of Appeals lacked
jurisdiction over Personnel Management Act
claim, and (2) discovery rule did not apply to
toll four-year limitations period applicable to
Rehabilitation Act claim.

Public

Employees

Court of Appeals could consider for first
time on appeal whether former employee of
Department of Public Safety failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under Personnel Management Act, which would deprive Court of subject matter jurisdiction
over action. U.C.A.1953, 67-19-1 et seq.
2. Appeal and Error «=>782
When a matter is outside the court's
jurisdiction the court retains only the authority to dismiss the action.
3. Administrative
<3=>229

Law

and

Procedure

Parties protesting agency actions must
generally exhaust all available administrative
remedies before seeking judicial relief.
4. Officers
and
<3>72.41(2)

Public

Employees

Former employee of Department of
Public Safety, who brought action seeking
vindication of Personnel Management Act
rights, failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies, and thus. Court of Appeals lacked
jurisdiction over Act claim vhere employee
allowed his Career Service Review Board
appeal to be dismissed for failure to prosecute. U.C.A. 1953, 67-19a-401(4)(a).
6. Civil Rights <s=>210

Affirmed.

L Officers
and
<£=>72.41(2)

5. Officers
and
«>72.41(2)

Public

Employees

Wrongful termination claim brought by
former employee of Department of Public
Safety was action in vindication of rights
created by Personnel Management Act, and
thus, Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act
required employee to pursue grievance
through administrative appeal, where employee failed to argue that Department entered in to any contract with him that altered
or added to terms and conditions of public
employment included in Personnel Management Act and implementing regulations.
U.C.A. 1953, 67-19a-401(4)(a).

Utah's four-year statute of limitations
applicable to personal injury actions generally applies to Rehabilitation Act claims. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 2 et seq., 29
U.S.CA. § 701 et seq.
7. Appeal and Error <£=>842(i)
Limitation of Actions <3= 199(1)
Issue of whether the discovery rule applies to toil the statute of limitations is a
question of law, and thus, the Court of Appeals needs to show no deference to the trial
court's ruling on appeal, but reviews the
ruling for correctness.
8. Limitation of Actions <s=>95(I)
"Discovery rule" tolls the running of a
statute of limitations in some instances when
a plaintiff was not in a position to know of
the existence of the cause of action before
the end of the limitations period.
See publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and definitions.

9. Limitation of Actions 0»95(1), 104(1)
"Discovery rule'' tolls a statute of limitations in the following three exceptional situations: (1) when the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) when a plaintiff does not
become aware of the cause of action because
of the defendant's concealment or misleading
conduct; amd (3) when the case presents
exceptional circumstances and the application
of the general rule would be irrational or
unjust, regardless of any showing that the
defendant has prevented the discovery of the
cause of action.
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10. Limitation of Actions <$=> 104(1)
Discovery rule did not apply to toll fouryear limitations period applicable to former
employee's Rehabilitation Act claim, based
upon employer's alleged concealment of existence of claim, where evidence indicated employee's termination v.as based on his job
performance, rather than on any perceived
mental disability, and employee failed to allege that coemployees took affirmative steps
to conceal claim. Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
§ 2 et seq., 29 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq.
11. Limitation of Actions <3=>104(1)
Under the concealment prong of the discovery rule for tolling the running of a statute of limitations, a plaintiff must establish a
prima facie case that defendants actively concealed the existence of a cause of action and
that, given defendants' actions, a reasonable
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim
earlier.
12. Limitation of Actions <3=>95( 15)
Discovery rule did not apply to toll fouryear limitations penod applicable to former
employee's Rehabilitation Act claim, based
upon exceptional circumstances, where employee knew all facts supporting his claims
within limitations period and these facts were
sufficient to put employee on notice that his
superiors believed he was unstable. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 2 et seq., 29 U.S.CA
§ 701 et seq.
13. Limitation of Actions <s=»95(l)
To meet the exceptional circumstances
prong of the discovery rule for tolling the
running of a statute of limitations, a plaintiff
must show that he did not know of and could
not reasonably have known of the existence
of the cause of action in time to file a claim
within the limitations period; once the plaintiff has made this showing, the court must
apply a balancing test to determine whether
a case presents exceptional circumstances
that render the application of a statute of
limitations irrational or unjust
14. Limitation of Actions <s=95(l)
Simple ignorance of or obliviousness to
the existence of a cause of action will not
prevent the running of a statute of limitations.

L, Zane Gill, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
Jan Graham and Debru J. Moore, Salt
Lake City, for Appellees.
Before BENCH, BILLINGS and ORME,
JJ.
BILLINGS, Judge:
Michael Horn appeals the trial court order
granting summary judgment in favor of the
Utah Department of Public Safety (the Department) and individual defendants in
Horn's suit for breach of employment contract, breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing, and disability discrimination. We affirm.
FACTS
Because this is an appeal from a granc of
summary judgment, we recite the facts in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
See Glover v. Boy Scouts of Am., 923 P.2d
1383, 1384 (Utah 1996). Horn presents the
following account of the events leading up to
and surrounding his termination from the
Department.
Horn was hired in 1985 as a programmer/analyst Although Horn was employed
by the Department and had access to sensitive law enforcement information, he was a
career civil servant and not a sworn police
officer. His primary responsibilities were to
provide technical assistance and to remain on
call to deal with computer problems for the
Bureau of Criminal Investigation (BCD and
the Driver License Division. From 1985
through 1987, Horn performed satisfactorily
and received positive evaluations on his job
performance. However, Horn concedes that
during this period his supervisor advised him
in job evaluations that he should try to improve his "political and people skills."
In 1987, Horn was appointed the technical
subcommittee chairperson for a "Request for
Proposal Committee" (RPC) formed by the
Department to select a vendor for a new
computer system. Horn's RPC duties were
in addition to his regular work. Horn lost
sleep, frequently worked cwenty-hour days,
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and felt stress and pressure because of overwork. As the RCP selection process progressed, Hom became convinced that his fellow committee members were acting illegally
to favor certain vendors. Hom confronted
the other RPC members about this perceived
illegal conduct. As a result of these confrontations, several coworkers lodged complaints
against Hom, and he was banned from th^
Driver License Division offices.
During the RPC dispute, Hom also became
involved in a dispute with his direct supervisor about overtime hours. Hom filed a
grievance on this issue and won an award of
additional overtime. Hom used the overtime
to take a leave of absence, and he was away
from the Department from November 1988
to May 1989.
In July 1989, Hom was assigned to supervise the Driver License Division annual job
run, a major annual event in which Department personnel purged the Driver License
Division computer files. Hom encountered
problems during the job run, and these problems led to a second internal affairs investigation. As a result of the job run incident,
Horn's immediate supervisor issued a letter
of intent to reprimand and met with Hom to
explain the reasons for the reprimand. The
supervisor was concerned with Horn's refusal
to obey the supervisor's direct orders, and
Horn's inability to provide a satisfactory explanation for the job run failure. Horn's
supervisor was also concerned because Hom
had ignored explicit instructions during the
job run. The supervisor informed Hom that
he could discuss disagreements and alternatives with supervisors, but in the future Hom
would be expected to carry out supervisors'
instructions even if he disagreed with them.
Horn objected to this requirement Horn
then made a statement about having the
power to crash and disable the Department
computer system. Hom asserts that he intended this statement as a claim that he
would not follow an order that would crash
the system. However, Horn's supervisor interpreted it as a threat that Hom would
crash the system.
After this meeting, Hom was placed on
temporary leave. On his return, Hom met
with the BCI chief to discuss the internal

affairs investigation and Horn's own plans to
file a grievance over the job run incident.
Hom alleges that the Department head attempted to dissuade him from prosecuting
his grievance and "warned him to work
things out with" his supervisor. At this
meeting, Hom made another statement about
his power to damage the computer system.
While Horn remembers this comment as a
response to a theoretical question, the BCI
chief remembers it as "coming out of the
blue" and sounding like a threat Shortly
after making this comment, Hom broke down
and began crying uncontrollably. The BCI
chief later stated that he felt Hom was "on a
downward spiral" and had become emotionally unstable. However, Hom states the BCI
chief never recommended that he seek counseling.
During the subsequent internal affairs investigation, Horn's superiors concluded that
he was responsible for the job run failure,
had acted insubordinately, and had perjured
himself. Hom was dismissed from the Department in March 1990. The Department
gave the following reasons for the dismissal:
1) Hom was perceived to be a security threat
2) Horn had committed perjury, 3) Hom had
committed malfeasances and misfeasance,
and 4) Hom had been insubordinate.
Hom appealed his termination administratively under the Utah State Personnel Management Act (Personnel Management Act),
but his administrative appeal was ultimately
dismissed for lack of prosecution. In 1994,
Hom filed suit against the Department
claiming that his dismissal violated the Personnel Management Act and Department of
Human Resources (DHR) regulations implementing that Act. In 1995, Hom amended his
complaint to add a disability discrimination
claim under the Federal Vocational Rehabilitation and Other Rehabilitation Services Act
of 1978 (the Rehabilitation Act), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 701 to 796 (Supp.1998). The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the
Department dismissing both claims. Hom
now appeals.
ANALYSIS
Hom presents two arguments on appeal.
First he argues the trial court erred in
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barring his wrongful termination claim under
the three-year statute of limitations for violations of rights created by statute. He asserts that his suit was an action for breach of
contract subject to the six-year statute of
limitations for claims arising out of contracts
ir /riting under Utah Code Ann. § 78-1223(2) (1996). Second, Horn argues the trial
court erred in refusing to toil the statute of
limitations on his disability discrimination
claim under the discovery rule. "Because
summary judgment presents only a question
of law, we review the trial court's determinations under a standard of correctness, according no deference to the trial court's legal
conclusions.n Maoris & Assocs., Inc. v. Images & Attitude, 941 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah
CtApp.1997).
I. Did Horn Fail to Exhaust His Administrative Remedies?
[1,2] As a threshold issue, we first address the Department's argument that we
lack jurisdiction over this case because Horn
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies under the Personnel Management ACL
Horn argues that we cannot consider this
issue because the Department did not raise it
before the trial court. We disagree. If Horn
has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, then we lack subject matter jurisdiction,
and we must dismiss the case "[rjegardless
of who raises the issue." Maverik Country
Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 P.2d
944, 947 (Utah CLApp.1993); see also HiCountry Homeowners Ass'n v. Public Sew.
Comm\ 779 P.2d 682, 684 (Utah 1989)
(holding court had no subject matter jurisdiction where plaintiff failed to timely appeal an
agency order); Heinecke v. Department of
Commerce, 810 P.2d 459, 462-64 (Utah Ct.
App.1991) (addressing defense of failure to
exhaust remedies though raised for first time
at oral argument on appeal). "When a matter is outside the court's jurisdiction it retains only the authority to dismiss the action." Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux,
767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct.App.1989).
[3] Under Utah law, parties protesting
agency actions must generally exhaust all
available administrative remedies before
seeking judicial relief. 'The basic purpose

underlying the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 'is to allow an administrative agency to perform functions within its
special competence—to make a factual record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its
own error so as to moot judicial controversies/ " Maverik Country Stores, 860 P.2d at
947 (quoting Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,
37, 92 S.CL 815, 818, 31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972));
accord State Farm MuL Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Utah Indus. Comm'n, 904 P.2d 236 (Utah
CLApp.1995).
[4, 5] In this case, the Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67I9a-L01 to -408 (1996), provided a clearly
available administrative remedy. The Grievance and Appeal Procedures Act provides a
formal review process for career service employee dismissals. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-19a-401 (1996). Furthermore, the Act
explicitly prohibits judicial review of a career
service employee's grievance when the employee has failed to pursue the grievance in a
timely manner:
(4)(a) Unless the employee meets the requirements for excusable neglect established by rule, if the employee fails to
process the grievance to the next step
within the time limits established in this
part, he has waived his right to process the
grievance or to obtain judicial revietv of
the grievance.
Id. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (1996) (emphasis added).
Horn failed to complete the administrative
appeal process. Horn initially appealed his
dismissal to the Career Services Review
Board (the Board) under the Grievance and
Appeal Procedures Act. However, Horn failed
to actively pursue his administrative appeal.
Thus the Board dismissed Horn's appeal in
1993 for failure to prosecute.
Horn attempts to dodge his jurisdictional
problem by casting his claim as a civil action
for breach of contract, rather than an action
to vindicate rights created by the Personnel
Management Act Horn argues that the Personnel Management Act and its implementing regulations created a contract of employment in writing that was sufficient to give
rise to a civil suit for breach of contract
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Horn relies on several Utah, casea to argue by
analogy that the Personnel Management Act
and implementing regulations create separate contractual rights for state employees.
These cases fall into two groups. The first
group- includes cases holding that public employees have a contractual, right to accrued
retirement benefits. See Ellis v~ State Retirement B<L, 757 P.2d 882, 886 (Utah Ct
App.1988), affd, 78a P.2d 540 (Utah 1989);
Newcomb v. Ogden City Pub. Sch. Teachers'
Retirement Comm'n, 121 Utah 503; 508-10,
243 PJ2d 941, 944 (1952). The second group
includes cases holding that personnel policy
manuals or other agreements between state
agencies and their employees can create contractual rights in addition to the public employees' underlying statutory" rights. See
Thurston v. Box Elder County, 835 P2d 165,
169 (Utah 1992) (piurston D; PiaciteUi v.
Southern Utah State College, 636 P.2d 1063,
1065-67 (Utah 1981). Both groups of cases
are clearly distinguishable from Horn's case.
Horn relies first on Utah cases holding that
public employees have a contractual right to
vested retirement benefits that cannot be
abrogated by new state legislation. Under
Utah law, public pension and retirement systems give rise to vested'contractual rights.
See; e.g., Ellis, 757 P.2d at 885-86; Driggs v.
Utah Teacher's Retirement £d, 105 Utah
417, 421-23, 142 P.2d 657, 659-60 (1943).
Horn, argues that his right to continued employment under the Personnel Management
Act is comparable to a state employee's right
to vested retirement benefits.

efit, i.e.rhe has attained retirement age, o
has been-medically disabled"
The crux of Ellis and other public retirement benefits cases was whether benefit
earned by retired employees under a previous legislative scheme could be diminished or
abrogated by new legislation. Horn's case is
not comparable to these cases because it is a
straightforward dispute about whether the
Department met the requirements of the
Personnel Management Act when it dismissed Horn, for cause. Thus we conclude
that our past treatment of vested retirement
benefits has no bearing on our characterization of Horn's claim of wrongful termination
under the Personnel Management Act
In addition to the retirement benefits
cases, Horn cites several Utah cases where
agency personnel manuals and similar documents were held to create contractual employment rights separate from the underlying statutory rights of public employees. See
Thurston /, 835 P.2d at 168; Thurston v
Box Elder Ccmnty, 892 P.2d 1034, 1037-39
(Utah 1995) (Thurston II); PiaciteUi 636
PJ2d at 1065-67. Horn claims these cases
show that the Personnel Management Act
and implementing regulations constitute a
written employment contract between Horn
and the Department We disagree.

In PiaciteUi the"Utah Supreme Court ad-'
dressed a claim by a counselor at a state
college that his termination violated his due^
process rights as set forth in the college's
personnel manual See PiaciteUi 636 V2d
at 1064. However, the employee in PiaciteUi
was explicitly exempt from the Personnel
"Utah and other jurisdictions have consis- Management Act, and the court found that^
tently treated vested-retirement and disabili- the college's personnel manual had created' a
ty* benefits* as an exception* to the general separate employment contract in place of the
rule that civil servants'' employment rights_ statutory scheme. See id at 1066. Under
are statutory rather than contractual See, these facts, the court found that Piacitellfs
&£, Miller v. California, 18 CaL3d 808, 135 employment relationship with the college was
CaLRptr.,386, 557 P.2d 970, 973 (1977); Gili governed by the college's personnel manual
v: Oregon, State Univ.,. 49 OrApp. 379, 619 and was therefore contractual rather than
?2a\ 938,. 939-40 (1980); Personnel Division statutory. See id. Thus, PiaciteUi involved
v. SL Clair, 10 OrApp. 106, 498 P.2d 809, 811 an exempt employee with a written contract
(1972). We acknowledged this distinction in separate from the Personnel Management
Ellis* 757 P.2d,at 886,i where we stated that a Act, and it has no bearing on Horn's claim
public employee obtains vested rights to re- that the Personnel Management Act and imtirement benefits "only when he has satisfied plementing regulations constitute an actionall conditions precedent to receiving his ben- able employment contract
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In Thurston I and Thurston //, a county
employee sued for wrongful termination,
casting his suit as an action for breach of an
employment contract created by the county
personnel manual. See Thurston I, 835 P.2d
at 167. The Utah Supreme Court remanded
the case, holding that the action was properly
a statutory claim under the Personnel Management Act See id at 170. On remand the
county argued that it was exempt from the
Personnel Management Act because it had
fewer than 130 employees. However, the
court below refused to overrule the supreme
court under the law of the case doctrine. See
Thurston II 892 P.2d at 1037. We conclude
that Thurston I and Thurston II do not
establish, as Horn claims, that public employees' wrongful termination actions should be
treated as suits for breach of contract
Other jurisdictions faced with similar
claims have uniformly rejected the proposition that a public employment act and implementing regulations, without more, create a
contractual right to continued public employment See. e.g., Tkorin v. Bloomfield Hills
Bd ofEduc, 203 Mich.App. 692, 513 N.W.2d
230, 237 (Mich.CtApp.1990) (Corrigan, P.J.,
concurring) (stating recognition of contractual claims "in the public sector would have
significant adverse policy ramifications . . .
[and] lead to the denial of the right of the
people, through their elected representatives,
to decide crucial political questions"); Smith
v. City of Newark 128 NJ.Super. 417, 320
AJ2d 212, 218 (1974), rev'd on other grounds,
136 NJ.Super. 107, 344 A.2d 782 (1975) (stating "it is well settled that 'the terms and
conditions of public service in office or employment rest in legislative policy rather
than contractual obligations, and hence may
be changed',f (citation omitted)).
Horn has not argued that the Department
entered into any contract with him that altered or added to the terms and conditions of
public employment included in the Personnel
Management Act and implementing regulations. We conclude that Horn's wrongful
termination claim is an action in vindication
of rights created by the Personnel Management Act Consequently, the Grievance and
Appeal Procedures Act required Horn to pursue his grievance through an administrative
appeal. By allowing his Career Service Re-

view Board appeal to be dismissed for failure
to prosecute* Horn "waived his right to ...
obtain judicial review" of his dismissal. Utah
Code Ann. § 67-19a-401(4)(a) (1996). Horn
has therefore failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and we have no jurisdiction
to adjudicate his statuary claim.
II. Did the Court Err in Dismissing
Horn's Federal Disability Discrimination Claim?
[6,7] Horn also filed a disability discrimination claim against the Department based
on the Rehabilitation Act 29 U.S.C. §§ 701
to -796 (Supp.1998). The statute of limitations for claims under the Rehabilitation Act
is the four-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury actions generally. See
Baker v. Boaid of Regents, 991 F.2d 628.
631-32 (10th Cir.1993) (holding statute of
limitations for Rehabilitation Act claims is
state limit applicable to personal injury
claims). Thus the trial court concluded this
claim was barred by the statute of limitations
and dismissed it. Horn concedes that the
four year statute of limitations applies to this
cause of action. However, he argues that the
trial court erred in dismissing his claim because the running of the statute of limitations
was tolled in his case by operation of the
discovery rule. "Because the issue of whether the discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations is a question of law, we
need show no deference to the trial court's
ruling on appeal, but we review it for correctness." Klinger v. Kightly, 791 P.2d 868, 870
(Utah 1990).
[8, 9] The discovery rule tolls the running
of a statute of limitations in some instances
where a plaintiff was not in a position to
know of the existence of the cause of action
before the end of the limitation period. See
Sevy v. Security Title Co., 857 P.2d 958, 96163 (Utah CtApp.1993), vacated in part, 902
P.2d 629 (Utah 1995). Utah courts will apply
the discovery rule in three exceptional situations:
(1) in situations where the discovery rule
is mandated by statute; (2) in situations
where a plaintiff does not become aware of
the cause of action because of the defendant's concealment or misleading conduct;
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and (3) in situations where the case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing
that the defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
Anderson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Ina, 920
P.2d 575, 578 (Utah CtApp.), cert denied,
929 P^d 350 (Utah 1996).
Horn urges us to apply*the discovery rule
in this case because 1) other Department
employees concealed torn him the fact that
his mental instability was one reason for his
termination, and 2) exceptional circumstances
exist in this" case that prevented him from
discovering the existence of a cause of action
under the Rehabilitation Act.

seek counseling but did not explicitly tell hi;
so- These facts do not add up to an afleg:
tion that Horn's coworkers "took affirmatrv
steps" that would have prevented, a reasor
able person from discovering this allege
cause of action. See Berenda, 914 PJM at 51
We find this case similar to Anderson, wher
we stated that "the facts underlying the alle
gation of fraudulent concealment are so tenu
ous, vague, or insufficiently established tha
they fail to raise a genuine issue of materia
fact as to concealment" Anderson, 920 ?2(
at 580 n. 4. Thus we conclude Horn has not
established a prima faae case of conceal
ment

A. Concealment
[10,11] Under the concealment prong of
the discovery rule, a plaintiff must establish
a prima facie case that defendants actively
concealed the existence of a cause of action
and that, given defendants' actions, "a reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered
the claim earlier." Berenda v. Langford, 914
P.2d 45, 51 (Utah 1996). Horn alleges the
following facts to establish a prima fade case
of concealment First, his termination notice
did not include mental disability in the list of
reasons for his firing. Second, in interrogatories during the early stages of litigation,
the defendants did not state that they
thought Horn was mentally or emotionally
disabled Third, in 'depositions later in the
litigation, several employees, including Horn's
direct supervisor, stated that they began to
worry about his mental stability toward the
end of his employment because he acted
irrational, angry, ,and "kooky." -

B. Exceptional Circumstances
[12-14] Horn also argues that his case
presents exceptional circumstances that justify application of the discovery rule. To meet
the exceptional circumstances prong of the
discovery rule, a plaintiff must make two
showings. First, he must show that he "did
not know of and could not reasonably have
known of the existence of the cause of action
in time to file a claim within the limitation
period." Sevy, 857 P.2d at 962. Once a
plaintiff has made this threshold showing, the
court must then apply a balancing test to
determine "whether a. case presents exceptional circumstances that render the application of a statute of limitations irrationai or
unjust" Id at 963. "Simple ignorance of or
obliviousness to the existence of a cause of
action will not prevent the running of the
statute of limitations." Anderson, 920 P.2d
at 578. "All that is required to trigger the
statute of limitations is . . . sufficient information to . . . put [plaintiffs] on notice to
make ftirther inquiry if they harbor doubts
or questions." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51.

These facts are insufficient to establish
that defendants took affirmative steps to conceal the existence" of a cause of action. First,
the evidence indicates that Horn's termination was based on his inability to perform
his job or interact acceptably with coworkers,
not on any perceived mental disability. Second, Horn has not alleged that any Department employees- took affirmative steps to
conceal a cause of action. At most, the facts
as Horn recounts them suggest that some
Department employees thought Horn should

Horn presents no evidence to support his
claim that he did not know or could not
reasonably have known of this cause of action. On the contrary, Horn knew all the
facts supporting his claims within the statutory period. Horn knew that he was under
severe stress. Horn was aware of his deteriorating relations with coworkers. Horn knew
of the complaints filed against him and of
other employees' statements that they feared
he was dangerous. He also knew that he
had been banned from the Driver License
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Division, and that his superiors had consulted State Personnel Management Act Thus we
the FBI because they thought he posed a dismiss Horn's wrongful termination claim
serious security risk. These facts were more
for lack of jurisdiction. We also conclude
than sufficient to put Horn on notice that his
that the discovery rule did not toll the runsuperiors believed he was unstable. Even
ning of the statute of limitations on Horn's
assuming such instability would qualify as an
disability a^crimination claim. Thus we hold
actionable disability, we conclude that the
that Horn's disability discrimination claim is
events leading up to and surrounding Horn's
barred by the statute of limitations.
dismissal should have put Horn on notice that
the Department might have terminated him
because of a perceived mental or emotional
BENCH and ORME, JJ. t concur.
disorder. Thus we hold the discovery rule
does not apply, and Horn's disability discrimination claim is barred by the statute of limitations.
CONCLUSION
We conclude that Horn failed to exhaust
his adininistrative remedies under the Utah

